O reconhecimento da inconstitucionalidade da tese de legítima defesa da honra e os limites necessários à plenitude da defesa do Tribunal do Júri

Abstract

The phenomenon of gender violence exists and is presented in several facets in society and Law, as a science that has its operating logic in regulating human behavior, must have the means to eliminate it. In this sense, where legal science is seen as an element that guarantees order and corrects injustices, it would be unreasonable to allow this element to be committing abuses. It is in this scenario that the legitimate defense of the honor thesis emerges. Such a defense argument can be used in the most diverse situations. As part of the present work, the core of the Allegation of Non-Compliance with a Fundamental Precept 779 will be used, which seeks to analyze the cases where this argument mainly affects women. As this topic is not unanimous, for a wing of jurists and legal practitioners, the defense is that it is a plausible argument and that could, yes, be used without major problems before the Jury Court this is sovereign to decide and assures the defendant the fullness of defense, which in theory would encompass any forms of argument. For another current of scholars, however, this is a hateful, archaic, obsolete thesis that fully expresses the latent remnants of a sexist society, where women are treated equally to a being inferior to others, where their much more valuable, which is life. The objective of the work is to demonstrate how the decision handed down by the Supreme Court changes the routine in the Jury Court and to analyze whether the constitutional principles attributed to the people's court were mitigated or if the decision placed them under a new perspective interpretative, following international diplomas and the Federal Constitution.