Identidade pessoal: realidade, ou ficção? discussões a partir de Leibniz e Hume

Abstract

This paper aims to discuss differences and some relations about the problem of personal identity in the philosophy of Leibniz and Hume. While in Leibniz's philosophy there is a sentiment of self that presupposes the real existence of the rational soul (simple substance of man) and the existence of efficient and final causes, in contrast, in Hume's philosophy the self is a fiction without a real base, but it is naturally affirmed in the common life and in the Field of moral with certain influence of his theory of knowledge and presuppose just efficient causes. It is highlighted in this paper that these philosophies are of antagonistic traditions, although they follow similar paths in their studies of personal identity that come from problems of theirs theories of knowledge especially in relation to causality, in addition, were perceived almost identical conclusions in examples like the ship of Theseus and connections between personal identity and moral.