Ciências comportamentais no setor público: evidências sobre a Teoria dos Prospectos e o impacto do dissidente estratégico na governança

Abstract

The foundation of Economic Theory is based on the rationality of the human being. However, the behavioral sciences show that the individual makes decisions that escape from the rational model. Thus, this research aims to investigate and describe the manifestation of behavioral heuristics and biases in Brazilian public administration employees, in decision scenarios under conditions of risk, and, in a second step, aims to analyze the use of the strategic dissenter as a behavioral tool to avoid or reduce biased decisions within the public sector governance model. The study was conducted by the experimental method, with intentional manipulation of independent variables in randomized comparison groups. A total of 162 employees of a federal public institution in the state of Alagoas participated in the research. The first stage of the research was based on the Prospect Theory. The results suggest that the participants were influenced by the framing effect, the anchoring heuristic, the proportional dominance bias, and the asymmetric dominance bias. No evidence of the status quo bias was found during the experiments. In the second stage of the research, it was observed that a scenario formed by a group of people whose opinions are divergent was not sufficient to create the cognitive dissonance capable of reducing confirmation bias, groupthink, and commitment escalation. Although, evidence was found that the use of the strategic dissenter modified the choice of the servers participating in the research, preventing or minimizing the manifestation of biases in the organizational environment of public governance. In addition, the age, time of work, and gender of the public employees who participated in the research had no influence on the dissident's action. It was concluded that the participants in this scientific study did not strictly follow the rational model in their choices, violating the Expected Utility Theory, and that the use of the strategic dissenter was necessary to reduce biased decisions that could impact actions in public governance. This study contributes in the theoretical sphere with new evidence for understanding behavioral phenomena in public administration and with fostering academic discussions to improve the architecture of choices in public management. The findings also point to the relevance of considering a behavioral pillar in the Brazilian public governance model. In the practical field, the evidence contributes to help public management understand the cognitive limitations of civil servants and implement routines and processes that can optimize decisions guided by the efficient and effective use of public resources, as advocated by the public governance model.