As concessões das empresas do setor energia elétrica e saneamento em Maceió: os casos da CEAL (Equatorial) e CASAL (BRK)

Abstract

This study examines the processes of concession (privatization) of public companies in the electricity (Ceal) and sanitation (Casal) sectors, as well as their consequences. These processes deserve analysis because they affect the used territory, guide investment flows, and deepen socio-spatial inequalities. The research is based on the hypothesis that the transfer of state assets to private monopolies, articulated within a neoliberal context of accumulation by dispossession, reconfigures the used territory, privileges areas with higher economic returns, and intensifies socio-spatial disparities. The general objective is to analyze the determinants (causes, foundations, and motivations) and the consequences of the concession of public services to private companies in the electricity and basic sanitation sectors in Maceió (Alagoas, Brazil). In the first stage of the research, the study sought to conceptually understand the meaning and consequences of public service concessions, drawing on critical approaches from Economic Geography. In this process, authors such as Milton Santos and Ignácio Rangel were central to reflecting on the role of the State, private institutions, and the population. Subsequently, the investigation focused on the geographical category of used territory. According to Milton Santos, this concept refers to a space lived through social, economic, cultural, and political interactions, where local dynamics connect with broader and interrelated structures. After these theoretical stages, the research advanced to an empirical analysis of the trajectory and historical development of BRK Ambiental and Equatorial Energia, from their origins to 2025. Following this, the study revisited the trajectories of Casal and Ceal, demonstrating that these services have always been embedded in political, economic, and territorial disputes. In both sanitation and electricity, early experiences with private sector participation were marked by contractual noncompliance, poor service quality, tariff increases, and a limited capacity for universalization. The results of the concessions analyzed — to Equatorial Energia in the case of Ceal, and to BRK Ambiental in the case of Casal — reinforce an interpretation of continuity rather than rupture with the historical problems of these sectors. Despite mandatory investments stipulated in contracts, tax incentives, and broad access to public financing, both concessionaires accumulated complaints, lawsuits, environmental sanctions, popular protests, and institutional conflicts. This reveals that the reorganization of services according to market criteria did not ensure equitable provision or an adequate response to social demands.