A liberdade e suas patologias: uma crítica à reatualização honnethiana da filosofia do direito de Hegel

Abstract

The present work aims to point out the proximities and possible distances between freedom in Hegel's understanding in the Principles of the Philosophy of Law and its updating promoted by Honneth in Suffering from indetermination, from there we will criticize Honneth's requests for this re-updating. For this, we divide it into two main parts: 1) the first is intended to examine separately the understanding of freedom in Hegel's Philosophy of Right (first chapter) and in Honneth's Suffering from indeterminacy (second chapter); 2) in the second, we will approach the main points of intersection between the understanding of the two authors, as well as those points of distancing, taking into account the Aristotelian theory of virtue. Hegel bases the effectiveness of freedom on ethics (Sittlichkeit), updating the Aristotelian theory of virtue, without failing to show the need for this freedom to pass through law and morality, taking the opportunity to show its limits in these two moments, thereby promoting a critique to the Kantian understanding. Honneth starts from this structure presented by Hegel, not only to reveal the pathologies of freedom, but also to form his own theory of justice and normative reconstruction, however, without taking into account the thought about virtue in Aristotle. Some points emerge from this confrontation that call attention: the limitations of Hegel's approach to ethics when dealing with the family, civil society and the State; the weaknesses of Honneth's theory of justice and its normative reconstruction; the breadth of understanding of freedom and the pathologies of freedom.