O íntimo e o privado para além do ordenamento jurídico

Abstract

This final paper seeks to investigate and analyze the concepts of intimacy and privacy/private/private life. Such concepts are recognized as inherent human rights since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The need for social isolation due to the health crisis caused by COVID-19 in 2020 made it possible to think about these concepts given that it is being in their own home that individuals, in contemporary times, see themselves in front of what they can call their own: your private life and your intimate life. From the works used it was possible to delimit three important moments for these concepts. The first is located in Greek antiquity, which was organized around the division between the private sphere and the public sphere, with clear delimitation. The second begins in late Antiquity and goes to the end of the Middle Ages. At that moment, the old delimitation between the public and private spheres begins to become less clear, due to the fusion between public and private power, which have come to be governed by the Church. Finally, the third moment begins in modernity and goes to the present day. It is only then that it is possible to speak of the emergence of intimacy as a form of relationship with other individuals and with oneself autonomously in order to escape the oppression of moralistic standardization. But intimacy and private life begin to have legal recognition only in the XIX century. And one notion that supports the concept of intimacy is that of autonomy/self autonomy, understood as the ability of individuals to deliberate, choose and act. However, being the self an entity without a stable delimitation, speaking of an autonomous self can become a problem, since such characteristics disregard the perturbations that affect the self. In this way, it is considered that intimacy, the intimate, is marked by something that does not properly depend on a self, whether it is “autonomous” or not.