Um estudo sobre a temporalidade na fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl

Abstract

This master’s thesis carried out a study on the phenomenology theory by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), on the theme time consciousness and, more specifically, on the origin and nature of time. For this, we used the book Lectures on the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness (in the Portuguese version) to underpin the text. However, we begin the research with the analysis of the distinction between natural attitude and phenomenological attitude in Ideas 1, which has, as a precursor of this appreciation, the discussion that Husserl makes between objective time and phenomenological time in the Lectures. The path taken by Husserl to prepare the terrain of phenomenology and its importance as a horizon involves the analysis of the doctrine of time by Franz Brentano (1838-1917), in relation to which Husserl makes several criticisms of the concept of fantasy as the creator of temporal moments and substantiates his own theory. Phenomenology is concerned, in temporal analysis, with the immanent apprehension of time, that is, how temporality occurs in the internal time-consciousness, and with the way conscious perception is characterized, in which we verify the impossibility of distinguishing what is past and what is present, for there is a temporal continuum in consciousness. For this continuum to be possible, we need to have, in consciousness, the sensation of duration, and this occurs when a stimulus that has disturbed our senses is retained through an act of consciousness itself. We can see that, in addition to retention, protention and recollection also have a fundamental role in the temporal continuum, as consciousness, in addition to retaining, also presents a protention, which is defined as a near-future expectation, of what is to come, anticipating something we do not yet have a sensible impression of. In this context, recollection is also understood as a conscious temporal moment (just as retention and protention). In it, we reach a temporal field beyond the reach of retention, because what is retained still insists and remains, but it happens that, in recollection, there is an experience which is no longer within the reach of retention, since it is no longer under the luminosity of the living present.